rostelecom and MTS capture the communication in temporarily occupied territories almost outright: Why are there still no strict sanctions?

Every day, russian propaganda produces tonnes of lies and broadcasts them in the temporarily occupied territories, using the seized networks of domestic operators. How does Ukraine try to counter this brainwashing? Do international organisations intervene? Speakers at the industry-related conference "Ukraine: Communication and Internet Resilience During the War" discussed this and much more. Mind gathered key facts and explains what exactly is happening with the communication in the 'zone'.

How do terrorists set up brainwashing? "When the occupiers gain control over the territory, the first thing they do is destroy the possibility of using Ukrainian communication. There are several reasons for this: creating stress for the residents, attempting to control their communication, and cutting off information transfer to the Armed Forces of Ukraine," says Stanislav Prybytko, the Head of Mobile Broadband Department at the Ministry of Digital Transformation.

"And once they have entrenched themselves, they start 'dealing' with internet service providers. Access to Ukrainian websites is blocked. Additionally, a bunch of international services are banned: Viber, WhatsApp, and so on. roskomnadzor, russia’s service for supervision of communications, information technology and mass media, gives providers a list of 'undesirable' information resources and VPNs, access to which must be prohibited. However, it is impossible to ban all VPN services, as alternative platforms constantly emerge. So people still have some form of communication and access to information," explains Glushchenko.

What did Ukrainian operators do? "They faced a very difficult choice. On the one hand, they should not collaborate with the occupiers, but on the other hand, they had to ensure communication for our citizens and provide them with access to state and banking services, among others. Disconnecting subscribers would label them as saboteurs, while cooperating would make them collaborators. So, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, our association sought clarification from the authorities," explains Oleksandr Savchuk, the Chairman of the Board of the Ukrainian Internet Association (UIA).

In the spring of 2022, the National Telecommunication Networks Operation Centre (NTNOC) issued an algorithm of actions in such cases – Directive No. 82. Market players were advised to block equipment interactions with the network in the controlled territory, eliminate the possibility of local management and granting permissions for equipment reconfiguration to any third parties.

How does russia 'build' communication in the temporarily occupied territories? Since 2014, the 'great nation' has been following the same scheme. "The internet provider IVC-Donbas emerged based on equipment seized from the internet provider Volia," Donetsk media openly explain, omitting the word 'stolen'. Phoenix and MKS (formerly Lugaсom) – mobile operators of the so-called DPR (Donetsk People's Republic) and LPR (Lugansk People's Republic) – are 'built' on equipment taken from Kyivstar. Krymtelecom and Sevtelecom were created using plundered assets of Ukrtelecom (recently the 'authorities' of Sevastopol handed over the second asset to the ownership of the russian ministry of defence). Exceptions to this rule are quite rare. Some local owners of internet service providers stayed in business in the 'zone', but they had to share a portion of it with ‘polite people’.

"If the network is operational, a local collaborator appears first, claiming ownership and starting to collect money from subscribers. Then armed gangsters arrive, take over the network, bring in engineers from russia or Crimea, and establish connections to Miranda (a Crimean backbone provider, 20% of which is owned by rostelecom – Mind). And all the traffic to the temporarily occupied territory starts flowing from russia. Subscribers receive russian IP addresses and are served through rostelecom servers," explains Glushchenko.

What was 'built'? In the temporarily occupied Crimea, there are currently around 40 internet service providers and 4 mobile operators that use stolen equipment and base transceiver stations from Ukrainian companies:

• "MTS is the only major operator that is semi-officially present in the region. However, this is because all calls from Crimea are processed through the Krasnodar Krai to avoid sanctions (for this reason, MTS subscribers in Crimea are subject to Krasnodar tariffs)," as described by russian media, openly exposing MTS's crime, while luring tourists to Crimea in the spring of 2023.
• K-Telecom (TM Win Mobile) and KTK-Telecom (TM Volna Mobile) are both owned by the company IС-Invest, which was created by Pavel Kuznetsov, former Vice President of MTS.
• Krymtelecom was sold by the Crimean 'authorities' in 2018 to the Management Company of Infrastructure Projects for 998 million rubles. It is believed to be owned by Vladimir Zaritsky, former chief of missile forces and artillery of russia. According to another version presented by russian media, Krymtelecom is under the patronage of russian oligarchs Arkadiy and Boris Rotenberg, as well as Evgeny Roitman.

In the temporarily occupied areas of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, three mobile operators appeared last summer: Donetsk's Phoenix, Mirtelecom associated with Miranda (a rostelecom subsidiary), and +7Mobile, owned by the Crimean K-Telecom and supervised by MTS. At the end of 2022, dmitry kim, deputy chairman of the russian ministry of digital development, openly admitted that MTS's network is operational in the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Lugansk oblasts. According to him, MTS has been operating on the Phoenix network since December 2022. It has also been reported that russian operators Tele2, Beeline, and MegaFon have agreed to launch national roaming in the occupied territories. These actions, de jure, should trigger international sanctions.

What about the quality of communication? The best situation would have been in the temporarily occupied areas of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, where Ukrainian operators managed to deploy 4G before the full-scale invasion. However, most of the undamaged equipment was stolen by the aggressors and taken to russia, where international vendors halted supplies. At least through official channels.

In other regions, the majority of subscribers are offered only 2G. During over nine years of occupation, russia has failed to establish reliable communication. "In Crimea, the speed and price of mobile internet leave much to be desired. 3G coverage can only be found in major cities such as Simferopol, Sevastopol, Yalta, Alushta, Feodosia, Kerch, Bakhchysarai, and Yevpatoria. And even then, not in all areas. 4G is even scarcer and is available only in Simferopol, Sevastopol, and Yalta. The backbone of mobile internet on the peninsula is slow 2G," according to russian media reports.

How do the occupiers attempt to destroy feeble competition and create a monopolist? "Nowadays, rostelecom and MTS are advancing under different proxy operator labels in the territories of the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Lugansk oblasts. All this is consolidated into one conglomerate of mobile communication and fixed internet," says Glushchenko.

The creation of a 'unified operator' on foreign territory was ordered by deputy prime minister dmitry chernyshenko in February 2023. In March, rostelecom-owned Miranda began recruiting employees to conduct audits and "develop local telecommunications infrastructure". Later, the russian radio frequency commission announced its intention to allocate (Ukrainian) frequencies for mobile communication in the territories of the so-called LPR and DPR to the companies K-Telecom and Miranda.

Miranda may acquire the assets of local communication operators and expand its operations based on their networks. To establish a foothold in the regions, it will have to integrate disparate network equipment and overcome a severe shortage of personnel," according to russian media reports, overlooking the factor of counteroffensive and the experience of seizure, rather than the purchase of foreign property.

How do international organisations react? Theft and profiting from the operation of foreign equipment, frequency resources, numbering plans, and support of terrorist communication by russian operators are criminal offences. "However, since 2014, international bodies have not responded actively enough to the fact that russians conducted tenders, allocated frequencies, built RTCS1 and RTCS2 networks, and created networks for so-called virtual mobile operators, which are hiding russian companies. And now they are seizing communication in the temporarily occupied areas of mainland Ukraine," says Glushchenko.

"A joint statement has now been prepared, and a resolution is being prepared. The issue is about obstacles posed by the russians. There are even complaints from some other countries regarding our supposedly improper use of our frequency resources, but currently, they are not under our control," Ponomarшov explains.

So far, only a few sanctions have been imposed. At the beginning of the full-scale war, the U.S. Treasury Department prohibited rostelecom from raising funds through its market. Later, Vladimir Yevtushenkov, the owner of AFK Sistema, which includes MTS, fell under British sanctions. However, the business was not affected as the oligarch resigned from his position as Chairman of the Board of Directors of AFK Sistema. Ukraine also managed to exclude russians from the leadership of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). However, more effective measures are needed, such as roaming cancellation, 'cutting off' from the global internet, international exchange points, and so on.

How is Ukraine trying to push back against the 'zombie box'? Oleg Chernysh, the Deputy Chairman of the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting, says that since 2014, numerous measures have been taken to ensure that people in temporarily occupied territories have access to Ukrainian television and radio. After the start of full-scale aggression, most satellite TV channels were decrypted. The first 11 transmitters of the MX-7 multiplex began broadcasting signals to the non-government-controlled territories. "The National Council, together with the Ukrainian State Centre of Radio Frequencies and Broadcasting, Radiocommunications & Television Concern, is estimating frequencies for broadcasting and addressing issues related to increasing the power of transmitters. We hope that the MX-7 will cover regions that are not covered by the Zeonbud transmitters," explains Chernysh.

He adds, however, that access to Ukrainian websites remains through VPN: "I hope people find a way to see what is happening in Ukraine and read the main messages."